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xpenences m
altered states
of conscious-
ness have often been
misunderstood as
being pathological
when, in fact, they may be healthy or exceptio-
nally beneficial. This appears to be, in part, be-
cause those who have had such experiences ha-
ve sometimes made claims that contradict the
predominant materialistic assumptions of much
ofWestern psychology. For example, those who
have had out-of-body experiences, possibly in
the context of near-death experiences, someti-
mes have claimed to have had veridical percep-
tions of physical events that they should not ha-
ve been able to have had through their sensory
faculties. However, studies are summartzed in-
dicating that remote perception without sensory
involvement can occur thereby emphasizing the
importance of evaluating experiences in alte-
red states of consciousness without restrictive
preconceptions. In fact, from the point of view
of transcendent states of consciousness, the nor-
mal waking state appears to be the pathological
state. Clearly, however, not all experiences in
altered states of consciousness are free of difft-
culties. In striving for transcendence, there is a
large class of religious and spiritual problems
that includes crises associated with spiritual
awakening, cult participation and relinquish-
Baltijas PSIHOLOQIJAS ZunwAl^S lse.;. l.' Nr.
ment of self-determination in favour of obedien-
ce to internal guidance. There are also prob-
lems of adjustment following transcendent, ne-
ar-death and alien abduction experiences. Al-
together, a mental health practitioner must lis-
ten to her client, keep an open mind and deve-
lop a keen sense of discrimination when eva-
luating experiences in altered states of cons-
ciousness.
Psychopathology of Altered States
of Consciousness
It is difficult to determine, sometimes,
which behaviours should be considered
consistent with noffnal human functioning
and which should be considered patholo-
gical. This problem becomes compounded
when we open the door to the further reac-
hes of the mind, as we do in altered states
of consciousness, and the distinction bet-
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ween madness and normality becomes blur­
red. The purpose of this paper is to push 
our understanding further by considering 
what is pathology, normality and exceptio­
nal well-being in altered states of cons­
ciousness. 
Pathology, Normality, and 
Exceptional Well-Being 
Perhaps the first thing to note is that Wes­
tern psychology is monophasic, that is to 
say, its subject matter is almost exclusively 
derived from a single state of conscious­
ness, namely, the normal waking state. Furt­
hennore, the normal waking state of cons­
ciousness is considered the optimal state. 
The presence of these characteristics of 
Western psychology, in conjunction with 
the prevalence of patbomorphism, the ten­
dency to label psychological phenomena 
using pathological categories, means that 
experiences in altered states of conscious­
ness have often been considered patholo­
gical when they may, in fact, be better la­
belled as normal or exceptionally benefi­
cial. For example, shamanic journeying in 
indigenous cultures may be undertaken by 
a shaman in order to resolve a problem in 
her community and involves her entering 
an altered state of consciousness, experien­
cing separation from her body, travelling 
in a world different from ordinary reality, 
encountering spirits, searching for informa­
tion or power that can resolve the problem, 
reentering her body and implementing the 
results of the journey in the community. 
While such experiences have often been 
labelled as symptoms of schizophrenia, ca­
reful comparison of shamanic journeying 
to schizophrenia reveals that they are not 
the same. In particular, for example, while 
someone with schizophrenia experiences 
disorganization and loss of control both for 
the onset of schizophrenic episodes and 
their contents, a shaman's journey is cha­
racterized by coherent imagery, control of 
the onset of the journey and partial control 
of the contents of experience (Walsh, 
1995). 
However, even if experiences in alte­
red states of consciousness were not pat­
hologized, they may nonetheless create dis­
ruption in a person's life and thus come to 
the attention of mental health professionals. 
Such disruption often occurs after near­
death experiences. These are psychologi­
cal events that are sometimes reported by 
a person who has been close to death for 
some period of time. A person may report 
having experienced a feeling of peace, se­
paration from her body, witnessing of 
events occurring within the vicinity of her 
body, encounters with deceased relatives 
or spiritual beings, the presence of a lo­
ving light, and a panoramic life review. 
Subsequently, a person's ideas about the 
nature of reality may be dramatically chan­
ged. She may come to believe that death is 
not the end of life, that our usual concerns 
about our material well-being are unimpor­
tant, and that the purpose of life is to love 
one another. Despite the overall positive 
nature of most near-death experiences, a 
person may experience anger and depres­
sion at having been brought back to life, 
career interruptions, fear of ridicu1e and re­
jection, alienation from one's relatives and 
acquaintances, and broken relationships 
including divorce from one's spouse. Many 
of these problems result from a person's 
inability to reconcile her altered sense of 
reality and changed values with the mate­
rialistic concerns of the people with whom 
she must interact (Greyson, 2000). 
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Psychology of Science
Perhaps we should pause before procee-
ding. After aII, psychology is a scientific
enterprise and should psychologists enter-
tain such manifestly absurd notions as tra-
velling outside of one's body and encoun-
tering spiritual beings? No matter how po-
sitive such experiences may be for the in-
dividual for whom they have occurred, is
there not something inherently wrong with
having impressions that one has teft one's
body or that one has communicated with
spirits? Indeed, psychologists write books
such as How to Think Straight About
Psychology (Stanovich, 2001) or, more pro-
vocatively, Psychobabble and Biobunk
(Tavris, 2001) in which such notions are
debunked in the name of scientific psycho-
logy. By all means, then, let us think
straight and cut through the psychobabble
of debunking itself using the methods and
knowledge base of scientific psychology.
In contemporary cognitive psychology
we have come to understand that human
beings organize their experiences using
cognitive structures called schem ata. In
particulag there are global schem ata, cal-
led worldviews that are used for making
sense of reality. Worldviews are mental
constructions, ideas, beliefs, theories, and
not themselves the reality for which they
are interpretations. The currently dominant
worldview in academia is that reality re-
sembles a billiard table. All phenomena,
including consciousness, result from the
predictable interactions of tiny particles.
But authentic science, of which scientific
psychology is a part,is the pursuit ofknow-
ledge using whatever means one can invent
to further one's understanding. The data ac-
quired through one's investigations form
the basis for one's theories. Not the other
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way around! Scientific theories change in
response to evidence. Scientists discard and
replace worldviews to reflect the results of
their investigations. Thus we now know,
from research in nuclear physics that mat-
ter is not made up of tiny tittiurd balls. Gi-
ven that that is the case, there is no point in
continuing to insist that all phenomena, inc-
luding consciousness, result from predic-
table interactions of tiny particles. The bil-
liard ball schema has become obsolete (Ba-
ruSs, 1996).
What are we left with? What is the
world really like? What is happening when
someone says that she is outside her body?
What is the nature of out-of-body percep-
tions? Are they purely products of the ima-
gination or are they veridical? Is it possib-
le for there to be visual perception without
visual sensation? Is, in fact,the brain even
necess aty for the presence of conscious-
ness? For a scientist, these are not matters
to be decided by one's a priori beliefs, but
research questions demanding empirical in-
vestigation and critical evaluation of the
subsequent results. Is there any evidence
at all to suppose that the world is other than
it appears to be in its everyday manifesta-
tion?
Occurrence of Anomalous
Experiences 
r
Let us consid er a case studied by Sabom
(1998) of a woman in the United States who
had aneardeath experience. In order to ex-
cise an aneurysm in her brain, a surgical
procedure known as hypothermic cardiac
arrest was used. During this procedure, her
body temperature was lowered to 60 deg-
rees Fahrenheit, her heartbeat and breat-
hing were stopped, and her brain activity
was reduced to the point where there were
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no brain waves over the cerebral cortex and
no auditory evoked potentials in response
to 100-decibel clicks, indicating a suppres-
sion of both cerebral and brain stem acti-
vity. Then the blood was drained from her
head. In the past, different measures have
been used for the presence of life, such as
breathing, heartb eat, cerebral brain activity
and brain stem activity. By any of these
measures, the woman was dead. However,
subsequent to the operation, she gave the
following account of her experiences.
As the bone saw cut through her skull,
the woman had the impression of leaving
her body through the top of her head and
looking down on the proceedings in the
operating room. Her description of events,
including, for example, her description of
the bone saw, turned out to be coffect even
though she had been anaesthettzed and her
eyes taped shut. As the operation progres-
sed through the hypothermic cardiac arrest,
she had the impression of being transpor-
ted as though she were going up in an ele-
vator. She heard her grandmother calling
her toward a light at the end of a tunnel.
As she moved toward the light, it increa-
sed in size until she was overwhelmed by
its brightness. She could discern not only
her grandmother, but other relatives in the
light. After some time with them, her unc-
le brought her back through the end of the
tunnel. She could see her body. It looked
dead. She did not want to get back into it,
but she did. And then it hurt (Sabom,
1998). This case suggests the possibility
of visual perception without visual sensa-
tion and the possibility of the continuation
of consciousness without brain activity.
Ring and Cooper did a retrospective
study of the near-death and out=of-body ex-
periences of 3 I blind people , 14 of whom
had been blind from birth. The accounts
of the near-death experiences of the 21 sub-
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jects who had had them are consistent with
those of the sighted, including the presen-
ce of visual impressions for 15 of the 2l .
For those who had had near-death or out-
of-body experiences, 9 of the 14 subjects
who were congenitally blind reported vis-
ual impressions. Furtherrnore, some oftho-
se blind from birth who did not claim to
have seen anything app ear to have had vis-
ual elements but were unable to identify
them as such because of their lack of ex-
perience with sight. For those blind from
birth, the visual impressions in near-death
experiences are striking given that their
brains have never been developed for vis-
ual processing. Thus, for example, there
are no visual images in the dreams of tho-
se who have been blind from birth, yet they
were present in the near-death experien-
ces of the congenitally blind participants
in the study. There was insufficient infor-
mation from sighted witnesses to conclu-
sively corroborate the physical reality of
the out-of-body perceptions of the blind
that coffesponded to physical events at the
time of the experiences (Ring & Cooper,
1997). Nonetheless, this study lends cre-
dence to the possibility of visual percep-
tion without the presence of visual sensa-
tions
That remote perception, that is to say,
perception without relevant sensory stimu-
lation, is possible, has been demonstrated
in a number of laboratofy studies. The re-
search sponsored by the United States go-
vernment in the 1970s at Stanford Research
Institute concernittg remote viewing, the
name given by Puthoff and Targ to ano-
malous perception at a distance, has beco-
me well known (Puthoff, 1996; Targ, 1996;
Targ &Katra, 1998), Subsequently, there
has been a spate of popular books about
the pu{ported military applications of re-
mote viewing (e.g., Schnabel, 1997; Mo-
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rehouse, 1996, Graff, 2000; Mandelbaum,
2000). A similar research program was ta-
ken up at the Princeton Engineering Ano-
malies Research Laboratory in the late
1970s verifying the positive results of the
earlier government-sponsored studies (Jahn
& Dunno, 1987; Nelson, Dunne, Dobyns
& Jahn, 1996). While participants in labo-
ratory research concerning remote percep-
tion have usually been in a norrnal waking
state of consciousness, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the accuracy of re-
mote perception is increased in altered sta-
tes of consciousness such as in a state of
hypnosis (Radin, 1997) and, indeed, that
anomalous events are more likely to occur
in altered states of consciousness (I(ripp-
ner & George, 1986). I should add the ca-
veat about hypnosis, that one has to be ca-
reful about making universal statements
about its effects, given the varieties ofphe-
nomena to which the label of hypnosis has
been attached and the increased propensity
for confabulation induced by hypnosis
(Kihlstrom, 1985; Frankel & Covino,
teeT).
A metanalysis of the extent to which
anomalous events coffespond to reality has
been given by Radin (1997) and a review
of the variety of anomalous experiences as
such can be found in Cardefra, Lynn and
Krippner (2000). Such summaries are be-
yond the scope of this paper. The point he-
re is that one must pay attention to a per-
son's account of her experiences without
pathol ogizing them out-of-hand because
they fail to conform to one's preconcep-
tions about reality. This caution extends to
the application of diagnostic categories to
individuals. For example, according to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (Fourth Edition) "belief in
clairvoyance" that is to say, belief that re-
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mote perception is possible, has been lis-
ted as a symptom of schizotypal persona-
lity disorder (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation,l994,p.645). We have just shown
that there are contexts in which experien-
ces of remote perception may arise for so-
meone and indicated that there is evidence
to support the veridical nature of some re-
mote perceptions. In other words, belief in
clairvoyance is not, in and of itself, an ill-
ness, and hence, should not be treated as
such. However this is not the same as sa-
ying that those who believe in clairvoyan-
ce necessarily experience veridical remote
perceptions. Whether or not they do is a
matter of investigation in each particular
case. If someone believes that her remote
perceptions coffespond to reality when they
do not, then this diagnostic criterion beco-
mes applicable. But not otherwise.
Pathology of Transcendence
There is another domain in which there has
been a tendency in the past toward patho-
morphism, namely thatof spiritual awake-
ning, spiritual aspiration, self-transforrna-
tion and the occurrence oftranscendent sta-
tes of consciousness. However, rather than
being pathological, there is increasing evi-
dence from research in the psychology of
religion that participation in religious acti-
vities is beneficial for one's well-being ,pdt-
ticularly during times of stress (Hood, Spil-
ka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996).In fact,
because of its beneficial value for an indi-
vidual, following upon Gardner's theory of
multiple intelligences (1 983), spirituality
has been conceptualised as a form of intel-
ligence, namely spiritual intelligence. Spi-
ritually intelligent individuals are those
who have the capacity for "transcenden-
ce," for entering "heightened spiritual sta-
r ., 2000.1
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tes of consciousness," for investing every-
day life with "a sense of the sacred," for
using "spiritual resources to solve problems
in living," and for "virtuous behavior" (Em-
mons, 1999, p. 164). For all its benefits,
there are nonetheless difficulties that a per-
son may encounter concerning spirituality.
That spirituality is not pathological but that
it can involve problems that may come to
the attention of mental health practitioners
is recognized by its inclusion in the sec-
tion "Other Conditions That May Be a Fo-
cus of Clinical Attention" of the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Di-
sorders (Fourth Edition) as"V62.89 Reli-
gious or Spiritual Problem" (American
Psychiatnc Association, 1994, p. 685).
What are some of these problems?
First of all, it is useful to make the dis-
tinction between religion and spirituality
as the distinction between "adherence to
the beliefs and practices of an organi zed
religious institution" and a person's rela-
tionship to a pu{portedly existent transcen-
dent reality without regard for religious
creeds (Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1 996,p.234).
Furtherrnore, for many people, the notion
of spirituality includes the idea that one is
on a journey of self-transformation in
which specific practices such as meditation
are used in order to experience transcen-
dent states of consciousness in which exis-
tential questions are eventually to be ans-
wered (BaruSs, 1996). There can be diffe-
rences in the types of problems associated
with religious observance and spirituality.
For example, loss of one's faith in the reli-
gious doctrines that one has previously co-
me to accept is a known religious problem
(Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1996). However,
while loss of faith may be a religious prob-
lem, it can also be a spiritual opportunity
in the sense that it challenges a person to
17
seek other sources of meaning. One way
to understand the possibility of such reo-
rientation, is to consider the cognitive, mo-
tivational and behavioural patterns of reli-
giosity that have been measured in the past.
The extrinsic orientation is characterized
by an attitude of expediency, so that one's
religious observances are superficial, not
integrated into one's daily life, and used in
the service of utilitarian needs such as so-
cial advancement. The intrinsic orientation
is characterizedby a commitment to a li-
ved religiosity that provides one with mea-
ning. Quest orientation is characterized by
confrontation with existential issues, refu-
sal to reduce the complexity of life, and an
ongoing search for truth wherever it may
be found. For those with a quest orienta-
tion, religious doubt is perceived to be a
positive characteristic (Hood, Spilka,
Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996). In other
words, one's loss of faith may result in the
loss of intrinsic religiosity but open the
door to quest and self-transformation. In-
terestingly enough, there has also been so-
me movement in the other direction toward
fundamentalism (Hood, Spilka, Hunsber-
ger & Gorsuch, 1996) perhaps from a need
to reduce the burden of self-determination
in the face of complexity (cf. Schwartz,
2000).
A crisis of any sort can sometimes be-
come an existential crisis and precipitate a
spiritual awakening. In such cases, regar-
ding any difficulties that arise for a person
as traditional psychopathologies can be
harmful to her. Thus it is wqrthwhile to dis-
tinguish between regressive pathologies,
which are characterrzed by an inability to
function nonnally within those spheres wit-
hin which nonnal functioning would be ex-
pected, and progressive pathologies, which
arise from spiritual awakening or aspira-
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tion (Baru5s, 1996). However, some spiri-
tual events can be so overwhehning that
they create disruptions in a person's abi-
lity to carry out the normal activities of her
life. The terrn "spiritual emergence" has
been used for reasonably benign manifes-
tations of spiritual awakening, while the
term "spiritual emergency" has been used
for those that are more traumatic (Lukoff,
Lu & Turner, 1996, p. 238). In extreme ca-
ses, the designation "spiritual emergencies
with psychotic features" has been used (Lu-
koff, 1996, p. 27I).
One of the most dramatic forms of spi-
ritual awakening, which responds poorly
to classical Western psycJriatric treatment
but well to treatments specifically desig-
ned for it, is that of kundalini rising. In the
Hindu tradition, kundalini is an energy that
purportedly rises from the base of the spi-
ne to the head at some point in a person's
spiritual development. In some cases, kun-
dalini experiences appear to occur sponta-
neously or as a result of experimentation
with yoga and breathing exercises (Scot-
ton, 1996). Healthy symptoms of kundali-
ni awakening can include the following:
sensations of ener1y, heat, or light that
rush up the spine . . . a perception of inner
sound often likened to the buzzing of bees
or the roar of a waterfall . . . perception of
intense white light . . . aprofound mystical
experience which can include union with
the divine, spiritual revelation, creative in-
sight, prophetic or psychic visions, or a pro-
found expansion of consciousness. (Kason
& Degler, 1994, p. 24)
However, a mental health practitioner
may also see "bradycardia . . .) tachycar-
dia, cool skin, flushed skin, spontaneous
trance states, and spontaneous assumption
of yogic postures." Treatment can include
reassurance by the clinician and immersion
Baltijus PSIHOLOQIJAS ZUfuNALS /sei. 1., Nr.
in mundane tasks so as to "refocus atten
tion on the ordinary world" (Scotton, 1996
p.26Q.
Inauthenticity
Authenticity refers to a person being self,
determining and acting on the basis of her
own understanding (Baru5s, 1996). In so.
me cases, spirituality can be inauthentic
Spiritual defences are spiritual beliefs tha
constrain a person so that she is unable tc
express herself (Battista , 1996). However
one has to be careful in how one deals witk
spiritual defences. The natural tendencies
that are constrained may themselves be des-
tructive, such as tendencies toward drue
abuse. Ideally one would like to encountet
and transform one's natural tendencies in
a constructive direction (Assagioli, 1988r
1991 ; Ferrucci, 1982). Offbnsive spiritua-
lity refers to the imposition of oneself on
others as someone who is spiritually deve-
loped, perhaps in order to coopt others for
the maintenance of one's own spiritual
identity (Battista, 1996). Clearly, there can
also be a point at which self-righteous im-
position of one's beliefs on others beco-
mes offensive.
A more dangerous version of inauthen-
ticity is one in which one abdicates respon-
sibility for oneself to such an extent that
there is no critical evaluation of the doctri-
nes of the religious org anization with which
one has become affiliated. In fact, cults are
charactertzed by the suppression of criti-
cism of the fundamental beliefs of the cult's
adherents (Baru5s, 1996). Someone who
dares to criticrze a cult's dogma or its lea-
ders risks being branded as being selfish
or evil and subjected to efforts to correct
her aberrant behaviour. If she persists in
failing to comply with the expectations of
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the cult and leaves, she may be told that
she has failed the test, that she is darnned
and that she has lost her opportunity for
enlightenment. "Feeling totally alone, the
ex-cult member fmay experience] a turmoil
of feelings: rage at the betrayal, fear of re-
taliation,, horror at the possibility of perpe-
tual damnation, grief at the loss of group
support and affectioo, and shame at having
been duped" (Deikman, 1996,p. 317). The
attendant anxiety, depression and loss of
self-confidence can bring ex-cult members
into therapy.
These psychological dynamics of inaut-
henticity are not confined to recognrzable
cults such as the "The People's Temple . . .
the Moonies and the Krishna devotees" but
are found throughout our society such as
in "large corporations, political groups,
professional organi zattons' government bo-
dies, and established religions" (Deikman,
1996, p. 321). For example, in the former
Soviet Union, one's allegiance was suppo-
sed to be to communism, while in the Wes-
tern world one is supposed to believe in
capitalism, the unbridled accumulation of
wealth, and rampant consumerism. The pe-
nalties for dissent may differ but the same
reliance on coercive strategies can be iden-
tified (e.g., Cialdini, 1988). Even the scien-
tific community is not exempt from cult-
like behaviour in that there is a version of
science known as scientism whereby one
is expected to believe that the universe is
essentially a physical place, that the fixed
methods used in science are the only way
in which anything can be known, and that
' all talk of spirituality and transcendence is
nonsense (Baruis, 1996). Those who fail
to acquiesce are sometimes nudged out of
the system by being refused research fun-
ding, by rejection of their work for publi-
cation, and by being barred from hiring and
19
promotion.
Indeed, our whole society can be
thought of as a cult. Our normal waking
state of consciousness can be regarded as
pathological; as a state of consciousness
in which we are labouring under the delu-
sion that the everyday world is real when,
in fact, it is not. And our 'oculture can be
viewed as a vast conspiracy against self-
knowledge and awakening in which we col-
lude together to reinforce one another's de-
fences and insanity" (Walsh, 1984, p. 58).
According to this perspective, the waking
state is not only not optimal, but a state of
psychosis. Or at least, the noffilal waking
state is an imperfect state superseded by
more enlightened states. Now, these are
dramatic claims. Is there any evidence for
them? The superiority of transcendent sta-
tes relative to the norrnal waking state is a
contention that has been made by many of
those who have experienced transcendent
states of consciousness (e.g., Merrell-
Wolff, 1994; 1995a; 1995b; Roberts, I 993;
1991 ; Wren-Lewis, 1988 ,1994). In that re-
gard, let us consider the experiences and
philosophy of Merrell-Wol ff.
Franklin Merrell-Wolff was born in
1887. After studies in mathematics and phi-
losophy, and a year of teaching mathema-
tics, he left a promising academic career in
order to seek "atranscendent mode of cons-
ciousness that could not be comprehended
within the limits of our ordinary forms of
knowledge" (Merrell-Wolff, 1994, pp.
251-252)" Twenty-four years of effort we-
re rewarded in 1936 with the occllrrence
of two fundamental realizations whose ef-
fects persisted until his death in 1985. For
Merrell-Wolff, the structure of events in
transcendent states of consciousness is dif-
ferent from that within the everyday mode
because the subject-object duality that cha-
Journal OF BALTIC PSYCHOLOGY tz000,Vot. l, No. l/
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racterizes the manner in which we ordina-
rily think is superseded by consciousness
without an object. There is an analogous
change in the manner in which we can
know something. Whereas there are only
the two processes of sensory perception and
rational thinking in our ordinary state of
consciousness, a third mode of knowled-
ge, char acterized by identification with that
which is known, becomes possible in trans-
cendent states. There is a "shift in the base
of consciousness" (Meme11-Wolff, 1 994, p.
264) from oneself as implanted in the rela-
tive domain to being "forcibly removed and
instantaneously transplanted into a super-
nal region" (Menetl-Wolff, 1994, p.264).
The everyday consciousness, which we as-
sume to be real, turns out to be only appa-
rently real, whereas the ground of being
experienced in transcendent states of cons-
ciousness, which seems ephemeral from
our everyday point of view, turns out to be
acfually real. Merrell-Wolff has used the
analogy of a mirage in the desert to cha-
racterize this ontological inversion: "when
one realizes a given condition is an illu-
sion, it not only ceases to be, but ceases
ever to have existed" (Merrell-Wolff,
I995a, p. 23).
Another pervasive manifestation of
inauthenticity in the context of transcen-
dence involves undue respect for subjecti-
ve imagery that is regarded as arising from
a superior level of being. Merrell-Wolff
maintained that there is a mode of know-
ledge in addition to sensory perception and
rational thought. The notion that we have
superior modes of knowledg e avatlable to
us is not an unpopular idea. In a 1986 sur-
vey BaruSs and Moore found that 55o/o of
334 academics and professionals who
could potentially write about consciousness
in the academic literature, agreed that "the-
Bultijus PSIHOLOQIJAS ZUhXAhS lsel. 1., Nr. 1.,2000.t
re are modes of understanding latent wit-
hin a person which are superior to rational
thought" (BaruSs, 1990, p. 17 6). In a sub-
sequent survey in 1996 at an international
academic consciousness conference, 69%
of 2I2 participants agreed with the same
statement (BaruSs & Moore, 1998). For
Merrell-Wolff, a superior mode of know-
ledge was activated in the course of a radi-
cal shift in the base of consciousness to a
transcendent state. Another way of concep-
tualising the activity of a superior mode of
knowledge has been to think of the perfu-
sion of the nonnal waking consciousness
or slightly altered states of consciousness'
such as sleep, with insights from a super-
conscious domain (Assagioli, 1965). In ot-
her words, one may experience intuitioll.
In unfolding one's potential as part of a pro-
cess of self-transformation, oie may deli-
berately seek to develop one's intuition and
to pay attention to the guidance that it pro-
vides. The point here is not to discourage
the effort to seek to acquire knowledge that
is superior to rational thought but to point
out the danger of uncritically trusting the
mental images that are assumed to be that
knowledge. There is also a related danger
in becoming dependent on guidance the-
reby relinquishing one's capacity for crea-
tivity and self-determination, both ofwhich
are constituent qualities of a whole human
being (BaruSs, 1996).
Dissociation
There is a more explicit version of guidan-
ce that of channelling accompanied by tran-
ce. Channelling is the process by which a
person believes herself to be acting as a
channel for information from discarnate en-
tities (Hane graaff, 1996). And trance is the
physiological and psychological state in
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which a person finds herself in the course
of channelling (cf. Lambek, 1989). Clearly
the definition of trance is circular. The
problem is that the physiological, cogniti-
ve, emotional and behavioural dimensions
of trance are not well understood (Walsh,
1995). In some cases, behaviour during
trance has been identified as possession
(Pattison, Kahan & Hurd, 1986). On the
other hand we could reconceptualise pos-
session as dissociation. Someone who pe-
riodically manifests a constellation of be-
haviours, including her expressed self-iden-
tity, that is significantly different from her
norunal self, can be considered a candidate
for Dissociative Identity Disorder (Kluft,
1996). Such reconceptualisation masks the
real question: is the source of the channel-
led information external or internal (Ba-
ruSs, 1996)? If we refrain from pathomorp-
hism and set aside our preconceptions, that
question has to be answered on a case by
case basis. In many cases, the answer will
remain unknown. And in many cases, it
may be difficult to determine if the chan-
nelling is detrimental or beneficial to the
person doing the channelling. However, to
the extent that channelling is inauthentic,
it may not be beneficial.
Some of the most enigmatic cases in al-
tered states of consciousness are those of
people claiming to have been abducted by
aliens. Alien abduction experiences are
charac terizedby "subj ectively real memo-
ries of being taken secretly and/or against
one's will by apparently non-human enti-
ties, usually to a location interpreted as an
alien spacecraft . . . where individuals are
subjected to complex physical and psycho-
logical procedures" (Appelle, Lynn 8.
Newman,2000, p. 254). The lifetime pre-
valence of alien abduction experiences has
been estimated at between .04oA and 2.00oh
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of the population (Miller, 1994). In other
words, the prevalence of alien abduction
experiences appears to be of the same or-
der of magnitude as the lifetime prevalen-
ce of schizophrenia. If that is true, why
don't we see these cases? The answer is
that no one in her right mind would admit
to a mental health practitioner that she be-
lieves that she has been abducted by aliens.
Noting that those in their right mind
would not report alien encounters leads to
the observation that "assessment by both
clinical examination and standar dizedtests
has shown that, as a group, abduction ex-
perients are not different from the general
population in terms of psychopathology
prevalence" (Appelle, Lynn & Newman,
2000, p.268). Experients do, however, of-
ten have various physical and psychologi-
cal problems, such as post-traumatic stress
disorder, that appear to follow upon alien
abduction experiences. And they appear to
have more adjustment probleffiS, including
an unusually high rate of reported suicide
attempts (Appelle, Lynn & Newm 4n,
2000). In addition to the failure to find
psychopathology that could account for the
abduction experience, Mack (1994) has gi-
ven four additional arguments why abduc-
tion phenomena cannot be explained in
psychiatric terms. First, reports from ab-
ductees in the United States who have had
no contact with one another are nonethe-
less similar even with respect to details that
have not been widely publicized. Second,
there are physical signs associated with ab-
duction experiences such as the physical
absence of abductees during the time of ab-
duction as reported by witnesses; "noseb-
leeds and various cuts, scoop marks, brui-
ses and other complexly patterned skin le-
sions;" and implants found after abduction
experiences, although none of these im-
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plants has been proved to be of non-biolo-
gical origin. Third, abduction accounts oc-
cur in children who are too young for the
psychiatric syndromes that are assigned to
abduction experients. Fourth, abduction ex-
periences have often been associated with
sightings of unidentified flying objects eit-
her by the experient or other witnesses. In
spite of those arguments, are alien abduc-
tion accounts just products of an overacti-
ve imagination? Perhaps. However, abduc-
tees are not high on hypnotisability or fan-
tasy proneness as one would expect if the-
se narratives were fantasies that had beco-
me indistinguishable from reality Appelle,
Lynn & Newman, 2000).
Drug-Induced Phenomena
Clearly, psychotropic drugs can induce or
affect altered states of consciousness. So-
metimes the effects are clearly pathologi-
cal. Such is the case with Substance-Indu-
ced Sleep Disorders, which can result from
intoxication with drugs such as alcohol,
amphetamines, caffeine, cocaine, opioids,
sedatives or other substances (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). For exam-
ple, fluoxetine, a bicyclic antidepressant
that inhibits the reuptake of serotonin, has
been found to interfere with sleep. In one
study of patients with major depression
being treated with fluoxetine, all 4l parti-
cipants had increased eye movements re-
lative to their premedication condition ac-
cording to at least one measure of oculo-
motor activity,33 had increased muscle ten-
sion, and 14 had both increased eye move-
ments and muscle tension in all sleep sta-
ges. Other studies have shown that these
effects appear not to remit with termina-
tion of drug use indicating that fluoxetine
may have long-term effects on the central
neryous system (Armitage, Trivedi & Rush,
1995). In the case of fluoxetine we have a
treatment for psychopathology that itself
produce s psychopathology.
Other psychoactive drugs, notably so-
me psychedelics, may have net beneficial
effects. The purpose here is to discuss the
neuropsychological effects of such drugs
without regard for their legal status in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. In no way should what
is said here be construed as endorsement
for the use of illegal drugs. Not only is il-
legal drug use illegal, but potentially dan-
gerous to the user, given that she is unli-
kely to know exactly what it is that she is
ingesting. For example, the drug 4-methox-
yamphetamine "has often been passed off
as the love drug MDA fmethylenediox-
yamphetamine], though it is ten times mo-
re powerful and has killed many of its
users" (Lavigne, 1999, p.373).
An example of the beneficial effects of
psychedelics was observed in what has be-
come the most famous experiment in the
psychology of religion, the Good Friday ex-
periment. On April 20, 1962, ten divinity
students were each given 30 milligrams of
the psychedelic psilocybin before a Good
Friday service. In evaluations done imme-
diately after the drug experience and at six
month and 24 to 27 year follow-upS, the
investigators found that the experiences of
the participants had had genuinely mysti-
cal features and that these experiences had
been evaluated by the participants as ha-
ving been important to their spiritual lives
(Pahnke, 1963; Doblin, l99l ). For exam-
ple, Mike Young has said that he had found
that "religious ideas that were interesting
intellectually before . . . fwere now] con-
nected to something much deeper than be-
lief and theory" (quoted in Malmgren,
1994, p. 1F). According to Young, direct
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personal experience had allowed him to va-
lidate his religious ideas. While psychede-
lic experiences appear to have not had ne-
arly the impact that some drug-free trans-
cendent experiences can have (Smith &
Taft, 1998), they have, in some situations,
promoted exceptional well-being.
Criteria for Pathology
Where does this leave us? How can we re-
cognrze psychopathology of altered states
of consciousness? Shedding the problem
of pathomorphism, our task becomes a dif-
ficult one. The unusual nature of a person's
experiences is not proof of aberrance so
that a mental health practitioner must lis-
ten with care to a client's account without
restrictive preconceptions. Degree of ad-
justment is also not a reliable indicator of
psychopathology since adjustment could be
impaired even though the underlying pro-
cesses are ones leading to eventual excep-
tional well-being as discussed, for exam-
ple, with regard to religious or spiritual
problems. Problems encountered in altered
states of consciousness may be progressi-
ve rather than regressive so that traditional
diagnostic categories and treatment strate-
gies are inapplicable. Perhaps the concept
of psychopathology is not a useful one for
experiences in altered states of conscious-
ness and, rather than trying to apply the
schemata of pathology and health, a men-
tal health practitioner can simply assist a
client to develop in constructive directions
irrespective of the nature of the experien-
ces themselves. This requires a good un-
derstanding of the varieties of human ex-
periences in altered states of consciousness
and the development of a keen sense of
discrimination.
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